



Insider Threat Prevention and Mitigation — A Problem-Based Learning Experience for Organizational Leaders

Participant Guide v2.1

Defense Personnel and Security Research Center (PERSEREC)
Office of People Analytics (OPA)

400 Gigling Road
Seaside, California 93955

PERSEREC-PA-21-35 | OPA Report No. 2021-090





Authors

DEFENSE PERSONNEL AND SECURITY RESEARCH CENTER

Stephanie L. Jaros
Callie J. Chandler

PERATON

Kristin G. Schneider
Yvette Montoya
JENSEN HUGHES
Sandra Ellis
Rachel Wolford

NORTHROP GRUMMAN

Marianne Hughes
Laversa Siebuhr
Christina Weywadt

Sponsors



PERSEREC is a Department of Defense entity dedicated to improving the effectiveness, efficiency, and fairness of DoD personnel suitability, security, and reliability systems. PERSEREC is part of the Office of People Analytics (OPA), which is a component of the Defense Human Resources Activity (DHRA) under the Office of the Under Secretary of Defense (Personnel and Readiness).



Within the National Counterintelligence and Security Center (NCSC), the primary mission of the National Insider Threat Task Force (NITTF) is to develop a Government-wide insider threat program for deterring, detecting, and mitigating insider threats, including the safeguarding of classified information from exploitation.



The Office of the Secretary of Defense (OSD) is responsible for policy development, planning, resource management and program evaluation. OSD includes the offices of top civilian defense decision-makers with regard to personnel, weapons acquisition, research, intelligence and fiscal policy, as well as offices the Secretary establishes to assist in carrying out assigned responsibilities.

Point of Contact

dodhra.threatlab@mail.mil

For additional information, please see:

Weywadt, C. R., Schneider, K. G., Wolford, R., Jaros, S. L. & Chandler, C. J. (2022). *Teaching organizational risk prevention and mitigation using a problem-based learning experience (RN-21-13)*. Seaside, CA: Defense Personnel and Security Research Center/ Office of People Analytics. OPA Report No. 2021-089



Contents

Overview	3
Purpose	3
Learning Objectives.....	3
Learning Experience.....	4
Recommended Agenda	4
Introduction ~30 Minutes.....	5
Small Group Discussion ~45 Minutes.....	6
Break ~15 Minutes.....	6
Class Discussion ~45 Minutes.....	6
Individual Recommendation ~15 Minutes.....	7
Review Recommendations and Wrap-Up ~30 Minutes.....	7
Appendix A: Doug Williams Case Synopsis	8
Appendix B: Information Gathering Worksheet	17
Appendix C: Case Analysis Tool.....	23



Overview

Purpose

Organizational leaders are responsible for their organization's culture, health, and well-being. Mismanagement at the organizational level can amplify employee dissatisfaction, disgruntlement, and counterproductive work behavior, increasing the risk of an insider threat incident such as espionage, theft, or workplace violence. Insider threat incidents occur when individuals use their authorized access to harm an organization's assets, including employees, wittingly or unwittingly.

This learning experience encourages participants to think critically about organizational issues related to a real-world insider threat case and apply what they know about risk prevention and mitigation.

Learning Objectives

After participating in the learning experience, you will be able to:

1. *Identify and Categorize:*
 - concerning behaviors displayed by the individual,
 - risk factors introduced by the organization's culture, structure, and organizational controls (or lack thereof), and
 - actions that the organization took in an effort to mitigate the potential threat posed by the individual.
2. *Evaluate* the organization's preparedness and response, identifying which actions taken by the organization helped to mitigate the potential threat and which actions failed to mitigate, or even exacerbated, the potential threat.
3. *Propose and discuss* alternative actions that the organization could have taken to prevent or mitigate the insider threat.






Learning Experience

This learning experience requires you, the participant, to read a case synopsis of a real-world insider threat incident related to workplace violence, identify, and categorize factors that contributed to the incident, evaluate the organization's preparation for and mitigation of the insider threat, and recommend strategies and alternative actions that the organization could have used to prevent or mitigate the incident.

The facilitator should have disseminated this Participant Guide prior to the in-class portion of the learning experience. Please prepare for the class by thoroughly reading the Doug Williams Case Synopsis (Appendix A) and completing the Information Gathering Worksheet (Appendix B) prior to the class.

Recommended Agenda

- Introduction (~30 minutes)
- Small Group Discussion (~45 minutes)
- Break (~15 minutes)
- Class Discussion (~45 minutes)
- Individual Recommendations (~15 minutes)
- Review Recommendations and Wrap-Up (~30 minutes)





Introduction ~30 Minutes



The facilitator will review the agenda and introduce you to the in-class portion of the learning experience, including an overview, the purpose, and the learning objectives. They will confirm you have received Participant Guide, read the Doug Williams Case Synopsis (Appendix A), and completed the Information Gathering Worksheet (Appendix B).

As you work through this learning experience, recall the Critical Pathway to Insider Risk Model (CPIR, shown in Figure 1) and how organizations play an active role in the prevention of insider threat incidents based on their preparedness and response to factors that precede a hostile act.

Figure 1
Critical Pathway to Insider Risk (CPIR) Model



Note: From “Application of the Critical-Path Method to evaluate insider risks,” by Shaw, E., & Sellers, L. (2015), *Studies in Intelligence*, 59(2), 41-48. <https://www.cia.gov/resources/csi/studies-in-intelligence/volume-59-no-2/application-of-the-critical-path-method-to-evaluate-insider-risks/> Copyright Studies in Intelligence.

The facilitator will present the Case Analysis Tool (Appendix C) and will guide you through the discussions. The Case Analysis Tool serves as a place to record your notes/thoughts during the discussions and document your proposed recommendation.



Small Group Discussion *~45 Minutes*



Your facilitator will assign you to small groups. Once you are in your group, begin the case discussion by addressing the first question on the Case Analysis Tool (Appendix C). Use the time in the small group to fill out the top row of the Case Analysis Tool (i.e., the “Small Group Discussion: Identify and Categorize” section). Your group can use the following questions to guide your discussion, as needed:

- How is Doug Williams’ history of interpersonal threats and intimidation related to the attack?
- Did Doug Williams demonstrate any pre-attack planning behaviors, such as acquiring weapons, performing target practice, performing surveillance, testing boundaries for vulnerabilities, or attempting attacks?
- How did the organization (e.g., William’s supervisors, managers, Equal Employment Office, and Employee Assistance Program) respond to employee concerns about Williams’ prior behavior in the workplace?
- What organizational vulnerabilities did Doug Williams exploit in the attack?
- How did the organization’s physical and operational security practices influence the outcome of the incident?

Each group member should fill out their own Case Analysis Tool and reference their Information Gathering Worksheet to help identify relevant details of the case.

A signal will indicate when it is time to begin wrapping up your small group discussion.

Break *~15 Minutes*

Class Discussion *~45 Minutes*



Your facilitator will facilitate a class discussion to evaluate the organization’s preparedness and response to the incident, identifying which actions taken by the organization helped to mitigate the potential threat and which actions failed to mitigate, or even exacerbated, the potential threat posed by the individual.

Take notes during the discussion in the “Class Discussion: Evaluate” section of your Case Analysis Tool (Appendix C) to answer the following questions:

- What actions did the organization take that helped to mitigate the potential threat?
- What actions did the organization take that failed to mitigate, or even exacerbated, the potential threat?



Individual Recommendation ~15 Minutes



After the class discussion, you will be given approximately 15 minutes to propose at least one action that the organization could have taken to prevent or mitigate the insider threat in this case.

Document your recommendation(s) and rationale in the “Individual Recommendation(s)” section of your Case Analysis Tool (Appendix C). Be prepared to justify your recommendation(s) and connect your recommendations to the CPIR model.

Review Recommendations and Wrap-Up ~30 Minutes



At the conclusion of the class the facilitator will ask you to share your recommendation(s) and generate a call to action, encouraging you to apply what you've learned to your own organization.

This is your opportunity to apply what you have learned from this experience to improve the policies and procedures relevant to threat response and mitigation within your own organization.

Use this time to address any additional thoughts or questions you may have.



Appendix A: Doug Williams Case Synopsis

Note: contains violent content and racist language.

“Workplace/organizational violence consists of any act or threat of physical violence, harassment, sexual harassment, intimidation, bullying, offensive jokes, or other threatening behavior by a coworker or associate that occurs in a person’s place of employment or while a person is working” (Cybersecurity and Infrastructure Security Agency, 2020).

This case study is about a workplace homicide at a Meridian, Mississippi facility owned by Lockheed Martin, the United States’ largest defense contractor. On July 8, 2003, Doug Williams, an employee, killed five employees and wounded nine more (one of whom died a week later, leading to a total of six victims killed) before turning the gun on himself.



The Insider Threat

On the morning of July 8, 2003, Doug Williams, 49, arrived for work at the Lockheed Martin (LM) subassembly plant in Meridian, Mississippi, which employed approximately 150 workers. Williams was an assembly worker who had worked at the plant for 19 years. He was angry that his managers required him—and 12 other LM employees—to attend an annual ethics and sensitivity training that morning. Williams, a white man, had a long history of making racist comments and threats against coworkers. He reportedly arrived to work that morning in an angry mood and repeated threats he had made previously about killing black coworkers (Ross & Scott, 2005).

As the training began at approximately 9:00am, Williams sat at a table with three black employees—Brad Bynum, Alvin Collier, and Sam Cockrell. A few minutes into the training, Williams stood up and angrily said, “You all can handle this,” and then stormed out to his truck in the employee parking lot (Halbfinger, 2003).

Williams reportedly saw his manager and plant supervisor, Jeff McWilliams, on his way out of the building and said he was going to “take matters into his own hands” (Ross & Scott, 2005). Following Williams’ comment, either McWilliams or another supervisor reportedly told employees, “If Doug leaves at lunch, I want you to go home.” When an employee asked why, the manager replied, “Well, I’m afraid of what he might do” (Ross & Scott, 2005).

Williams returned to the classroom at approximately 9:30am carrying a 12-gauge shotgun, a semiautomatic rifle, and a bandolier of shotgun shells strung across his chest. Williams announced, “I told y’all to stop (expletive) with me. Didn’t I tell y’all not to (expletive) with me?” and then fired several shots. Williams’ first victim was Mickey Fitzgerald, a white coworker who had stood up to calm him



down (Halbfinger, 2003). Witnesses stated that Fitzgerald had said to Williams, “‘Doug, you really don’t want to do this.’ Doug says, ‘Yeah, I want to do this,’” and then he shot Fitzgerald in the face (Halbfinger, 2003).

Williams then turned to a group of black employees huddled on the floor. He reportedly said, “There’s four right there,” and shot them, killing Sam Cockrell and wounding three others: Delois Bailey (who later died of her injuries), Al Collier, and Charles Scott (Ross & Scott, 2005).

Collier was shot in the shoulder and torso but tried to wrestle the gun away from Williams. “Aren’t you all going to help me?” Collier yelled at his coworkers as they ran from the room. Williams then shot Collier a third time in the hand, and Collier fell to the ground (Gold & Hart, 2003).

Williams then left the classroom and went to the production floor. A long-time coworker, Pete Threatt, saw Williams jogging toward him and the plant supervisor, McWilliams, who was standing nearby. When Threatt, a white man, saw that Williams was armed with weapons and ammunition, he stepped in front of Williams and tried to take the shotgun from him, saying, “Doug, what are you doing? Don’t do this!” (Watkins, 2018).

Threatt said Williams was so pumped up with adrenaline that he easily flung off Threatt’s attempts to wrestle away the shotgun. Williams pointed the gun at Threatt’s chest and told him, “Get out of my way, or I’ll kill you, too” (Watkins, 2018).

Williams began jogging toward other employees at their workstations. Threatt followed him and shouted warnings to workers, but the plant floor was noisy with machinery, and most people were wearing ear protection. Meanwhile, McWilliams and others called 911 at 9:43am (Carmichael, 2003).

Williams walked through the aisles of workstations, shooting repeatedly. Threatt saw him target and shoot three black employees: Lynette McCall, Thomas Willis, and Charlie Miller. Witnesses stated that Williams taunted McCall before shooting her at point-blank range: “Didn’t I tell you I was going to kill you, (expletive)?” (Ross & Scott, 2005).

As other employees screamed and ran away, Williams’ coworker and girlfriend, Shirley Price, approached and pleaded with him to stop shooting. He then killed himself with a gunshot to the abdomen (Watkins, 2018).

Police arrived at the plant at 9:49am. They surrounded the facility and helped employees get outside. The entire incident lasted approximately 15 minutes. Williams killed five employees besides himself and wounded nine more, one who would die a few days later in the hospital.

Police found additional firearms in Williams’ truck parked outside the plant: a .22-caliber Magnum, a .45-caliber pistol, and a .22-caliber rifle with a scope as well as a large amount of ammunition (Halbfinger, 2003). No security guards were on-site at the building where the shooting occurred, according to the Lauderdale County Sheriff (Carmichael, 2003).



Leadership Awareness of the Threat

LM is a global defense contractor in security and aerospace, headquartered in Bethesda, Maryland. The company employs over 114,000 people around the world. LM's subassembly plant in Meridian, Mississippi, opened in August 1969 and has produced aircraft parts for several airplanes including the JetStar, F-22 Raptor fighter jet, and military transport aircraft (Lockheed Martin, 2019).

Although several coworkers told authorities and news outlets after the shooting that Williams had made many death threats and racist statements, including racial slurs, over the years, LM President Dain Hancock said during a July 9, 2003 news conference that the company had been aware of only two complaints involving Williams during his 19-year LM career. Hancock said (Lockheed Martin, 2003):

“His employment files show his performance on the job was solid, with two exceptions that came to management's attention. The two incidents noted unacceptable behavior in the workplace.

In December 2001, Mr. Williams supposedly made threatening remarks during a confrontation with another employee. As a result of a company investigation and his own admission of a problem with his temper, Mr. Williams was required to undergo professional psychological counseling. After satisfactorily completing the treatment, he was cleared to return to work and no further instances were reported for the next year and a half.

The only other situation we are aware of occurred on June 12 of this year. Mr. Williams placed some protective clothing over his head, which was perceived as offensive by another employee. Williams was ordered to remove the 'hat' or leave the premises. He chose to go home. The employee who complained was notified of management's actions.

These are the only known incidents that were reported to management. Both incidents were taken seriously and dealt with promptly” (Lockheed Martin, 2003).

The Two Documented Incidents

The first of the two incidents that management documented in Williams' employment file took place in December 2001, when he threatened to kill a black coworker, Aaron Hopson, because he thought Hopson was “propositioning” a white woman, Phyllis Huffmaster, after Hopson paid her a compliment. According to several reports from LM coworkers, Williams did not believe in black and white people “mixing.” Williams also stated he would go to the plant and “kill a bunch of n—s, then I'm going to kill myself.” LM managers documented this incident in Williams' file, suspended him, and required him to attend counseling for two weeks (Casetext, 2007).

Coworkers, including Thomas Willis and Lynette McCall, who would later become victims of Williams, were interviewed by Darryl Sawyer from LM's EEO department about Williams' December 2001 threats. Willis told Sawyer that a few years earlier, Williams had been laid off temporarily from LM and threatened to “get his rifle and 'pick off' employees as they left the plant.” This prior incident had not been documented in Williams' employment file. Willis added that LM should enforce its policy on



harassment, which stated that employees would be dismissed for serious violations (Ross & Scott, 2005).

In response to the first documented incident, in which Williams threatened to kill coworker Aaron Hopson, Sawyer referred Williams to the company's Employee Assistance Program, NEAS, who then sent him for counseling with Psychology Associates, a private company in Meridian contracted by NEAS. According to a lawsuit filed against LM by Willis' daughter in 2003, neither LM nor NEAS informed Psychology Associates about Williams' death threats, racial slurs, or racist attitudes. As a result, Williams met with counselor Jennifer Whitcomb in three sessions only "to deal with common issues and anger management," and he was back to work at the plant two weeks later after completing the sessions.

The second incident LM President Hancock mentioned in his statement happened only two weeks prior to the shootings. Williams wore a white shoe covering on his head for most of the workday that resembled the hoods worn by Ku Klux Klan (KKK) members. When a black employee complained about it to a manager, the manager instructed Williams either to take off the hood or go home. Furious, Williams went home and did not return to work for five or six days (Halbfinger, 2003). The manager did not write up the complaint in Williams' file because the employee who reported the behavior wanted to remain anonymous. Williams believed it was Sam Cockrell who had complained, and he killed Cockrell just two weeks later (Ross & Scott, 2005).

The Historical Context

LM executives and the local Sheriff initially argued that the shootings were not racially motivated. They pointed to the fact that Williams 1) had the opportunity to kill Brenda Dubose, a black coworker, but did not, and 2) killed one white employee, Mickey Fitzgerald, and wounded several others (Ross & Scott, 2005). In response, Bill Blair, attorney for the Willis family in a lawsuit against LM, said that no one in this region of Mississippi would want the shootings to be associated with racism "because of Lauderdale County's terrible racial past" (Ross & Scott, 2005). The history of the County included multiple murders of black residents at the hands of white vigilantes and the shooting of civil rights workers by Klansmen.



The Local Insider

Williams was born in 1954 in Clarke County, Mississippi, near Meridian. He graduated from Clarkdale High School in 1973, married, and had two children. Williams began working for LM in 1984. He went through a “bitter divorce” in 1989, according to his coworker, Pete Threatt. When Williams and his ex-wife Donna first separated in 1988 and appeared in court for a temporary custody hearing, Williams was so “visibly distressed” that the judge ordered him to attend counseling before he could return to court (MS, 1988).

At the time of Williams’ death in 2003, his son and daughter were in their early 20s, and Williams had been living with his girlfriend, Shirley Price, for four years. The couple had a doublewide mobile home on a dirt road east of Meridian (Halbfinger, 2003).

Clarke County Sheriff Todd Kemp said that Williams grew up going to church, and “to the best of my knowledge, he was a pretty straightforward, churchgoing man.” According to Williams’ parents, though, their son was “an angry man” (Halbfinger, 2003). Williams had suffered from depression since his divorce and was taking two antidepressants, Celexa and Zoloft, according to Threatt (Carmichael, 2003). Williams had been working Sundays and several overtime shifts and overnights at the plant, said Sheriff Sollie, who responded to the 911 calls from LM workers on the day of the shooting (Halbfinger, 2003).

Fellow LM employees were not surprised when they learned that Williams was the shooter. LM managers knew Williams kept loaded weapons and ammunition in his truck parked in the employee lot, according to one of the lawsuits filed against the company. Williams’ login password at work was also “white power” (ABC News, 2005).

He had a reputation at work as a “bad-tempered racist who disliked being told what to do” (Wordsworth, 2003). Williams was frequently angry when black coworkers received higher-paying jobs or complained about his racial slurs to LM managers (Ross & Scott, 2005). He thought that black people “had a leg up in society,” according to his girlfriend, Shirley Price (Franklin County Times, 2003).

Williams had a list of “good n—s and bad n—s,” according to Bobby McCall, Lynette McCall’s husband (Ross & Scott, 2005). Family members of Reverend Miller, one of Williams’ victims, recounted that several years prior to the shootings, Williams preached to black children at the local shopping mall and told them “He was trying to fill up the black folks’ side of heaven because the white folks’ side was full” (Wordsworth, 2003).

According to Threatt, Williams had longstanding resentments and ongoing arguments with a number of employees (Watkins, 2018). Another coworker, Melvin Young, said Williams had issues with white and black employees, but that Williams was not a racist: “It was people he had a problem with—most of them were just black” (Wordsworth, 2003).

Lynette McCall, one of the victims that Williams reportedly taunted before shooting, had told LM management that Williams had said she was “on his list” and that he foresaw a race war coming (Ross & Scott, 2005). Her husband, Bobby McCall, said he and his wife talked daily about her fear that Williams



would carry out his threats to kill black coworkers: “He [Williams] said he was going to do what he did today, and then kill himself. He used the word ‘n—.’ That’s who he referred to when he was talking about it.... She just kept telling me: ‘Don’t worry about me. I’m watching him. I’m keeping my eyes on him. And I’m trying to steer clear of him’” (Gold & Hart, 2003).

During a memorial service for the victims two days after the shootings, Williams’ girlfriend, Shirley Price, stood up and stated, “Excuse me. Don’t criticize this man. He was a human being, too.” She held up the service program with the names of those wounded and killed and added, “His name was not on here...he was a victim, too...he was a kind and loving human being.” After several people came to Price’s side to quiet her, two city administrators escorted Price from the auditorium to her car. Outside the church, Price told reporters that Williams believed everyone was against him and that he knew he had problems, but “Lockheed officials had ignored him when he sought help” (Franklin County Times, 2003).

Among the many lawsuits filed against LM by victims’ families in the years following the shootings was a claim by the Doug Williams Estate. The attorney for the estate, Greg Malta, stated that “racial animosity cut both ways” and that LM managers punished Williams unfairly and were trying to get him to leave the company. Malta added that Williams had asked LM for mental health care help but did not receive it, and eventually, “Williams couldn’t distinguish between right and wrong” (Monk, 2004b).

The Aftermath

In July 2004, the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (EEOC) in Jackson, Mississippi, sent a letter to LM officials stating that “Williams created a racially hostile work environment through ‘hostile, threatening, and demeaning comments’ and threats to kill black coworkers.” The EEOC added that LM did not take appropriate action prior to the shootings and that the plant’s “racially charged atmosphere grew in intensity until the shootings” (Joyce, 2004).

By 2004, at least eight wrongful death and similar lawsuits had been filed against LM for not protecting its workers at the Meridian facility from Williams (Monk, 2004a). In 2008, however, a federal appeals court ruled that LM was not responsible for compensating the victims and family members for Williams’ actions; rather, those claims could be considered under workers’ compensation guidelines. This ruling limited damage awards under Mississippi law to \$150,000 per victim (Mohr, 2005).



Policy Changes Made to Prevent Future Workplace Violence

The shootings in 2003 “served to heighten the awareness of Lockheed Martin officials to the threat of workforce violence,” said LM spokesperson Johnny Whitaker in a 2013 statement on the 10-year anniversary of the tragedy (Land, 2013).

He said that LM increased security measures at all of its plants and prohibited personal weapons on the worksite, except where allowed under state laws. Whitaker added, “We have redoubled our efforts to protect our employees with everything from specific security measures, to training on how to personally protect oneself and coworkers should violence break out in their work areas, to valuing a diverse and inclusive working environment at every Lockheed Martin facility worldwide” (Lockheed Martin, 2017).

Fifteen years after the shootings, Williams’ former coworker, Pete Threath, retired from LM after 35 years. He said that after the incident, the company made clear that harassment against coworkers was prohibited: “There is zero tolerance for making a comment that could be taken as anger toward someone or a threat. Say something once, you’re fired” (Watkins, 2018).

Today, LM has a zero-tolerance policy for discrimination and harassment, which is laid out in the company’s Code of Conduct (Lockheed Martin, 2017).

To help unite and heal the town of Meridian, one of the victim’s family members, Stacey Miller, has sponsored Reconciliation Week every July since 2005. In 2021, the week-long set of activities included delivery of lemonade to first responders, a mayor’s prayer luncheon, and a memorial motorcycle ride. Two scholarships for graduating high school seniors were established in memory of Reverend Charlie Miller, and each year a donation is made to a local charity (Jackson, 2021).

“We’re doing this for them, for the voiceless, for those who were affected but may not feel as comfortable in speaking out. We know many of them are still hurting and so we want to speak for them and let them know that the community still loves them, has not forgotten about them, and that we’re going to move on in their name, doing things for good,” said Miller (Jackson, 2021).



Appendix A References

- Carmichael, F. (2003, July 13). Anatomy of a nightmare: Tracing events of a tragic Tuesday. *Franklin County Times*. <https://franklincountytimes.com/2003/07/13/anatomy-of-a-nightmarebr-tracing-events-of-a-tragic-tuesday/>
- Casetext. 2007. Tanks v. NEAS, Inc., 519 F. Supp. 2d 645 (S.D. Miss. 2007). <https://casetext.com/case/tanks-v-neas>
- Cybersecurity and Infrastructure Security Agency. (2020, November). *Insider threat mitigation guide*. https://www.cisa.gov/sites/default/files/publications/Insider%20Threat%20Mitigation%20Guide_Final_508.pdf
- Donna Marie Mabry Williams vs. Douglas P. Williams. Case No. A-2161. (1988).
- Gold, S., and Hart, L. (2003, July 9). Gunman kills 5 co-workers, self. *Los Angeles Times*. <https://www.latimes.com/archives/la-xpm-2003-jul-09-na-shooting9-story.html>
- Girlfriend: Williams was a victim, too. (2003, July 11). *Franklin County Times*. <https://m.franklincountytimes.com/2003/07/11/girlfriend-williams-a-victim-too/>
- Halbfinger, D. M. (2003, July 10). Factory killer had a known history of anger and racial taunts. *The New York Times*. <https://www.nytimes.com/2003/07/10/us/factory-killer-had-a-known-history-of-anger-and-racial-taunts.html>
- Jackson, T. (2021, July 5). 2003 Lockheed Martin shooting victims remembered. WTOK ABC Newscenter 11. <https://www.wtok.com/2021/07/05/2003-lockheed-martin-shooting-victims-remembered/>
- Joyce, A. (2004, July 13). Lockheed let racism brew, EEOC says. *The Washington Post*. <https://www.washingtonpost.com/archive/business/2004/07/13/lockheed-let-racism-brew-eec-says/0ca9e0b0-eddb-442a-af6d-ae13d7bbab2e/>
- Land, M. (2013, July 19). Lockheed-Martin remembers deadly shooting anniversary. *The Mississippi Link*. <https://themiississippiink.com/2013/07/19/lockheed-martin-remembers-deadly-shooting-anniversary/>
- Lockheed Martin. (2003). *Text of Lockheed Martin Aeronautics president's comments to news media in Meridian, Mississippi*. <https://news.lockheedmartin.com/news-releases?item=123133>
- Lockheed Martin. (2017). *Setting the standard: Code of ethics and business conduct*. <https://www.lockheedmartin.com/content/dam/lockheed-martin/eo/documents/ethics/code-of-conduct.pdf>
- Lockheed Martin. (2019). *Lockheed Martin's Meridian, Miss., facility celebrates 50th anniversary*. <https://news.lockheedmartin.com/2019-08-29-Lockheed-Martins-Meridian-Miss-Facility-Celebrates-50th-Anniversary>



- Mohr, H. (2005, July 24). Lockheed shooting ruling is 'salt in the wound,' victim's family says. *The Greenwood Commonwealth*. <https://www.gwcommonwealth.com/archives/lockheed-shootings-ruling-salt-wound-victims-family-says#sthash.ljiBANVg.pW1moORB.dpbs>
- Monk, S. (2004a, March 21). First domino falls in Lockheed lawsuits. *Franklin County Times*. <https://m.franklincountytimes.com/2004/03/24/first-domino-falls-in-lockheed-lawsuits/>
- Monk, S. (2004b, July 8). Lockheed: Eight lawsuits, more than 50 plaintiffs. *Franklin County Times*. <https://m.franklincountytimes.com/2004/07/08/lockheed-eight-lawsuits-br-more-than-50-plaintiffs/>
- Pettus, E. W. (2016, June 21). 'Mississippi Burning' case now closed, exposed KKK terror. Associated Press. <https://apnews.com/article/bf2ea5e9eb074209b850646b31673834>
- Ross, B, & Scott, D. (2005, November 10). *Lockheed murders targeted Blacks*. ABC News. <https://abcnews.go.com/Primetime/story?id=749286&page=1>
- SCRIPT: Lockheed Martin shooting. (2005, May 12). ABC News. <https://abcnews.go.com/Primetime/story?id=1817672&page=1>
- Trimble, M. (2017, August 14). *KKK groups still active in these states in 2017*. US News and World Report. <https://www.usnews.com/news/best-states/articles/2017-08-14/the-kkk-is-still-based-in-22-states-in-the-us-in-2017>
- The riot of 1871. (2006, July 22). *The Meridian Star*. https://www.meridianstar.com/news/local_news/the-riot-of-1871/article_853b1fdb-0cd8-58cf-b81f-a1fcc44d4910.html
- Ward, J. M. (2016, May 3). The infamous lynching bridge that still stands in Mississippi. *Time*. <https://time.com/4314310/hanging-bridge-excerpt-mississippi-civil-rights/>
- Watkins, B. (2018, March 8). Mass shooting, gun crime survivors: Here's what they have to say on gun control, violence. *Mississippi Clarion Ledger*. <https://www.clarionledger.com/story/news/2018/03/08/mass-shooting-gun-violence-survivors-speak-gun-control-rights/397253002/>
- Wordsworth, A. (2003, July 11). Co-workers lived in fear of Mississippi killer: Bad-tempered racist: Rampage followed session on getting along with others. *Canada National Post*. [https://advance-lexis-com.libproxy.nau.edu/api/document?collection=news&id=urn:contentItem:491Y-JWWO-01D6-K305-00000-00&context=1516831](https://advance.lexis-com.libproxy.nau.edu/api/document?collection=news&id=urn:contentItem:491Y-JWWO-01D6-K305-00000-00&context=1516831)



Appendix B: Information Gathering Worksheet

Instructions: Use the categories and questions below to identify and organize key case information. Completing this worksheet will help you to develop your recommendation(s) to help the organization avoid a similar insider threat incident from occurring in the future¹.

Case Details

Below are some key details about the individual's demographics, the individual's intentions, and the case outcome to consider as you evaluate ways the organization could have prevented this incident.

Individual of Concern

Name:

Age:

Gender:

Race:

Marital Status:

Educational History:

Military History:

Employment Status & History:

Was the event intentional/malicious or unintentional/accidental?

What was the individual trying to achieve?

¹ In some cases you should expect that the case may not contain the details to address a specific element of this worksheet. That's okay! We simply want you to be aware of the range of factors you should consider as you evaluate insider risk and Insider Threats.



The Outcome

Describe the harms or losses experienced by the organization.

Concerning Behaviors

Use this section to summarize known information about the concerning behaviors of the individual.

Concerning Communications

Prior to the attack, what did the individual do or communicate to others that caused concern? Did their actions or communications indicate that an attack was imminent?

Attack-Related Behavior

Describe whether the individual demonstrated any pre-attack planning behaviors, such as acquiring weapons, performing target practice, performing surveillance, testing boundaries for vulnerabilities, or attempting attacks? Did they conduct any “final acts” (e.g., giving away possessions, writing a suicide note, sending a manifesto)?

Concerning Interests

Prior to the attack, did the individual demonstrate an interest in weapons or violence?



Significant Behavioral Changes

Did anyone notice significant behavioral changes in the individual (e.g., not sleeping, looking unkempt)?
Was anyone afraid of the individual and, if so, why?

Personnel Violations

Did the individual violate any organizational policies or experience any job performance problems before the incident?

Grievances and Resentments

Was there evidence of any real or perceived grievances and resentments the individual had toward people or organizations (e.g., job dissatisfaction)?

Organizational Factors

Organizational security is the responsibility of the entire organization. Use this section to consider how risk mitigation and prevention can occur at many levels of the organization.

Job/Task Level Factors

Job Characteristics/Design

Were there any characteristics of the individual's job/position or situational opportunities (e.g., location of workplace) that may have influenced the outcome of the incident?



Group Level Factors

Group Dynamics

Describe how group dynamics, cohesiveness (or lack thereof), and leadership in the individual's workplace influenced the outcome of the incident.

Organizational Structure & Culture

Organization Culture

Describe the characteristics, goals, and culture of the organization that may have played a role in the case example.

Organization Socialization and Ethics

Describe how the organization's values and priorities may have contributed to the incident.



Organizational Controls

Personnel Screening

Describe how the organization's personnel security practices may have influenced the outcome of the incident.

Physical Security

Describe how the organization's physical and operational security practices may have influenced the outcome of the incident.

Cyber Security

Describe how the organization's information security practices may have influenced the outcome of the incident.



Organizational Risk Management Systems:

Management Systems

Describe how the organization's management system or business processes may have influenced the outcome of the incident.

Communication Systems

Describe how the organization's communication systems or procedures may have influenced the outcome of the incident.

Organizational Interventions

Summarize any actual or potential organizational interventions that may have influenced the outcome of the incident.



Appendix C: Case Analysis Tool

Small Group Discussion: Identify and Categorize

List any concerning behaviors displayed by the individual.

List any risk factors introduced by the organization.

List any actions the organization took in an effort to mitigate the potential threat.

Class Discussion: Evaluate

What actions did the organization take that helped to mitigate the threat?

What actions did the organization take that failed to mitigate, or even exacerbated, the potential threat?

Individual Recommendation(s)

Write down at least one alternative action that the organization could have taken to prevent or mitigate the insider threat. Provide justification for your recommendation(s).